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FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW

In the past term, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed a variety of issues in the area of federal practice and procedure. The court interpreted rules of civil and appellate procedure, defined the jurisdiction of
district and appeals courts, and reviewed district court discretion. The court
broke new ground when it interpreted the amended rules of appellate procedure for the first time. Several well-publicized cases were decided on procedural issues, thus not reaching the substantive and constitutional matters for
which they received their publicity. This survey will examine the decisions
in which the Tenth Circuit changed or clarified current practices in the past
year in the area of federal practice and procedure.
I.
A.

DISTRICT COURT JURISDICTION

Removal Jurisdiction

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was required in Madsen v. Prudential
FederalSavings & Loan Association I to define the district court's removal juris-

diction in what was perhaps the most complex practice and procedure case
before the court this term. The Madsens sued in state court claiming breach
of contract and unjust enrichment. They sought to recover interest which
Prudential had realized on escrow accounts. 2 Prudential subsequently filed
an action for declaratory relief in federal court, removed the state court action to federal court, and had the two cases consolidated. Summary judgment was granted in favor of Prudential. The Madsens appealed claiming
3
that the removal was improper.
Prudential contended removal was proper under section 1441(b) of the
Judiciary and Judicial Procedure Act which permits the removal of "[a]ny
civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on
a claim or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United
States ....
-4 District courts have original jurisdiction under the Judiciary
and Judicial Procedure Act of "any civil action.
arising under any Act of
Congress regulating commerce. . ,5 and of "all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000 . . . and arises

under the Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States."'6 The key
question became whether the Madsens' claims were claims that "arise
1. 635 F.2d 797 (10th Cir. 1980).
2. Id. at 799. Under a trust deed agreement, the Madsens were making monthly payments to Prudential for their taxes and insurance; the money was placed in escrow by Prudential until it made one yearly payment from the escrowed funds. Id.

3.
4.
5.
6.
fect the

Id. at 799-80.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (1976).
Id. § 1337.
Id. § 1331(a). Section 1331 has since been amended, but the modifications do not afinterpretation of the statute made in Madsen. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (Supp. II 1979).
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under" federal law. 7
Prudential argued that regulation of federal savings and loan associations is so extensive that Congress has preempted the area, and the Madsens'
claims necessarily arose under federal law or involved a substantial federal
question. The court disagreed. The Tenth Circuit had previously established a standard for determining whether a complaint asserts a claim arising under federal law.8 The action must be expressly authorized by federal
law, must require the construction of a federal statute and/or regulation,
and must be required by some distinctive policy of a federal statute to be
determined by application of federal legal principles. 9 Although there is extensive regulation in the savings and loan associations area, the Madsens'
claims sounded only in contract and did not rely on authorization by federal
law. Every federal issue raised in the case was raised by Prudential. Even if
federal preemption had been established, it would not have conferred jurisdiction when raised by the defendant to defeat a common law contract claim
brought in the state court.' 0 Further, the Madsens' claims did not require
construction of a federal statute or regulation, even if raised in Prudential's
defense. II
As a final measure, Prudential argued that the last prong of the test had
been met-a distinctive policy of a federal statute or regulation required the
application of federal legal principles.' 2 Thus, extensive regulation in the
area demanded application of federal common law to the definition of "contract." The court acknowledged this to be true in some instances where
and the
there is "a significant conflict between some federal policy or interest
1
use of state law,"' 3 but that situation did not exist in this case. 4
The court concluded that since all the bases for federal jurisdiction had
been raised in Prudential's defense, the case had been 5removed improperly.
Therefore, the case was remanded to the state court.'
7. The court noted that the "same standards apply to whether the issue 'arises under'
federal law in section 1331 and section 1337." 635 F.2d at 800 n.6.
Prudential did not and could not argue that federal jurisdiction can be established by any
defense or counterclaim. Federal jurisdiction must be established on the face of the complaint.
Id. at 800-01. Seealso Pan Am. Petrol. Corp. v. Superior Court, 366 U.S. 656 (1961); Skelly Oil
Co. v. Phillips Petrol. Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950); Gully v. First Nat'l Bank, 299 U.S. 109 (1936).
8. Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Johnson, 586 F.2d 1375, 1381 (10th Cir. 1978).
9. Id.
10. 635 F.2d at 801.
11. As the Madsen complaint was framed, the case could have been decided on common
law principles of contract if the defendants did not raise the federal regulation as a defense.
12. 635 F.2d at 802.
13. Id. (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petrol. Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966)).
14. The regulation Prudential principally relied upon, 12 C.F.R. § 545.6-11 (c) (1980), contemplated variances between states on whether interest would be required to be paid on escrow
accounts. 635 F.2d at 802.
15. 635 F.2d at 803. The federal declaratory judgment action begun by Prudential was
also dismissed. The court determined that the claims of the federal action were actually embodied in the defenses in the state action. In such a case, the federal court will not seize litigations
from the state court. Id. at 803-04. See also Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237,
248 (1952).
On the related issue of appellate review of remand orders in removed cases, the court in
four unpublished opinions found it had no jurisdiction to review the orders. Estrada v. Cuaron,
No. 80-1793 (10th Cir. Nov. 14, 1980); Strickland v. Roosevelt County Rural Elec. Coop., No.
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B.

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

Abstention

The validity of an abstention order was reviewed in Arrow v. Dow. 16
Appellants were members of the State Bar of New Mexico. They claimed
that a lobbyist hired by the New Mexico Board of Bar Commissioners acted
outside the scope of the functions of the State Bar, and these actions effectively denied appellants their rights guaranteed by the first, fifth, and fourteenth amendments.' 7 The district court abstained and dismissed the
complaint, finding that proceeding in the federal court would conflict with
an overriding state policy. 18 The Tenth Circuit ruled that the abstention
was proper but that the complaint should be held in abeyance, not
dismissed. '9
The court found the principle first enunciated in Rairoad Commission of
Texas v. Pullman Co. 20 controlling. The Pu//man doctrine holds that a district
court, even when it has jurisdiction, should "stay the action in the federal
forum if the construction of pertinent but unclear state law by the state
courts may obviate the necessity for a decision of the federal constitutional
question or substantially modify the constitutional issue." 2 1 The rule under
which the lobbyist was appointed and from which his authority was purportedly derived had never been construed in the state courts, so the case in22
volved an unsettled question of state law.

The district court's reliance on Burford o. Sun Oil Co. 23 was misplaced
24
because Burford did not involve new or unsettled areas of state law.
Rather, the state in Burford had such an elaborate review system in that particular subject area that the lower court abstained rather than impose an
impermissibly disruptive effect on state policy. 25 Therefore, the abstention
in Arrow occurred because state law in the area is unsettled, not because the
state has an overriding policy. Nevertheless, the federal constitutional question undoubtedly would be presented in a different light after the state construed the rule and the lobbyist's activities. 26 For these reasons, abstention
27
was proper to obtain state guidance on pertinent but unsettled state law.
80-1701 (10th Cir. Nov. 14, 1980); Holguin v. Dawson, Nos. 80-1584, 1585 (10th Cir. Nov. 14,
1980); Palmer v. Pace, No. 80-1064 (10th Cir. Aug. 26, 1980).
16. 636 F.2d 287 (10th Cir. 1980).
17. Appellants were required by state law to be members of the state bar and to pay annual fees. Specifically, they claimed that the use of a portion of these fees to pay a lobbyist
whose actions were not approved by appellants deprived them of constitutional rights under
color of state law in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). 636 F.2d at 288-89.
18. 636 F.2d at 287.
19. Id. at 291.
20. 312 U.S. 496 (1941).

21. IA MOORE's FEDERAL PRAc'rICE 0-.20311] (2d ed. 1981).
22. 636 F.2d at 290.
23. 319 U.S. 315 (1943).
24. 636 F.2d at 290.
25. Id.
26. As the court noted, this aspect of the abstention doctrine is clearly laid out in Colorado
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976): "[a]bstention is appropriate 'in cases presenting a federal constitutional issue which might be mooted or presented in
a different posture by a state court determination of pertinent state law.' " Id. at 814 (quoting
County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 189 (1959)).
27. 636 F.2d at 290.
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Abstention is not a doctrine by which federal courts can avoid cases
completely, however. Once federal jurisdiction is properly invoked, the case
should not be dismissed simply because part of it involves unsettled state
law. 28 The state court may never address the federal issues, so if the federal
court had abstained and dismissed the case, this would have amounted to
abdication of its judicial responsibility. The Supreme Court has recognized
that a party should have the right to litigate federal issues after the pertinent
state matter is concluded. 29 In Arrow it was especially important to retain
30
jurisdiction because the state procedures to review the rule were uncertain.
To insure plaintiffs' rights are protected, the federal court should retain jurisdiction until the state has had adequate time to act. If satisfactory progress
were not made, the Tenth Circuit implied the federal district court could
31
proceed on its own.
C.

Preemption

The jurisdiction of federal district courts extends only to those areas
which Congress has designated. 32 Congress can deny federal courts authority over certain cases otherwise in their jurisdiction by vesting that authority
exclusively in another body. 33 This doctrine of preemption operates in the
field of labor law where Congress has vested jurisdiction over certain na34
tional labor policies solely in the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
District court jurisdiction was challenged in Silkwoodv. Kerr-McGee Corp. 35 on
the ground that Congress had given exclusive jurisdiction of the contested
matter to the NLRB.
The estate of Karen Silkwood brought suit against the Kerr-McGee
Corporation, the FBI, and various individuals for allegedly violating
Silkwood's constitutional rights when she and other Kerr-McGee employees
began organizing a union. 36 Defendants claimed that preemption had
placed jurisdiction of the action with the NLRB because "[w]hen an activity
is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the [National Labor Relations] Act [29
U.S.C. §§ 157, 158], the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the
exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board . . .37
However, courts often have been reluctant to find their jurisdiction pre38
empted by the NLRB.
The Tenth Circuit found that a more elaborate standard than the Gar28. See Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-14
(1976).
29. England v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411 (1964).
30. 636 F.2d at 289-90.
31. d. at 291.
32. See generally 13 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION § 3522 (1975).
33. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
34. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976).
35. 637 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1980).
36. d. at 745.
37. Id. at 746 (quoting San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 245
(1959)).
38. See, e.g., San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. at 244 n.2.
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mon standard advocated by the defendants has evolved through United
States Supreme Court decisions, 39 and that the guiding principle to be used
when a jurisdictional conflict arises revolves around the nature of the interests being asserted. 40 Three factors developed in Farmerv. United Brotherhood
of Carpenters4 ' were found to be controlling when applying the standard:
First, whether there exists a potential for a direct conflict of substantive law between the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
and the state or federal cause of action; second, whether there is a
state interest "deeply rooted in local feeling and responsibility";
and third, whether adjudication of the cause of action interferes
with the effective administration of national labor policy by
decid42
ing issues identical to those underlying the labor dispute.
No problems surfaced when the first two criteria were applied, 43 but the
court was concerned that the third criterion presented a serious obstacle to
judicial jurisdiction. 44 The plaintiffs had described the alleged violations as
being directed against those involved in unionizing activities. Judicial treat45
ment of this issue would be identical to that performed by the NLRB.
Thus, recent court decisions would indicate the court is preempted from acting. 46 However, the Tenth Circuit found that such consideration was not
controlling. It reasoned that the three factors evolved from and are controlled by Congress' intent based upon a "balanced inquiry into such factors
as the nature of the federal and state interests
in regulation and the potential
47
for interference with federal regulation.
A "balanced inquiry," according to the court, demonstrated that interference with labor policy was of secondary importance to the case. Primary
constitutional issues outweighed issues arguably under the National Labor
Relations Act. Assumption of jurisdiction by the federal courts would not
substantively "interfere with effective administration of national labor pol39. The standard demands that "the decision to preempt federal and state court jurisdic-

tion over a given class of cases must depend upon the nature of the particular interests being
asserted and the effect upon the administration of national labor policies of concurrent judicial
and administrative remedies." Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 180 (1967).
40. 637 F.2d at 746.
41. 430 U.S. 290 (1977).
42. 637 F.2d at 746 (citing Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 430 U.S. at 298).
43. The allegations of the plaintiff indicated little possibility of a conflict of substantive
law. Ms. Silkwood was allegedly deprived "of civil rights through a conspiracy and course of
conduct involving wiretapping, surveillance, discriminatory firing and transfers, breaking and
entering, and life-endangering harassment on public highways." 637 F.2d at 746. The lawsuit
created sensational headlines in the national news media, even to the point of intimating that
some of the defendants were responsible for her death. Consideration of these issues posed no
substantive conflict with the NLRB's jurisdiction over labor and union policies. Id. at 747.
Outrageous activities such as those alleged did not come within the scope of protection or authority of the NLRB. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S.
180 (1978); Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290 (1977); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171 (1967); San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
44. 637 F.2d at 746.
45. Id. at 747.
46. Id. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Dist. Council of Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180 (1980);
Bova v. Pipefitters Local 60, 554 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1977); and Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. v.
Gorman, 476 F. Supp. 1382 (N.D. Iowa 1979).
47. 637 F.2d at 747 (quoting Farmer v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 430 U.S. at 300).
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icy" as Congress had intended the policy to be governed. 48 "[Tihe Labor
Management Relations Act 'leaves much to the states [and to the federal
courts], though Congress has refrained from telling us how much . ..

.'

This penumbral area can be rendered progressively clear only by the course
of litigation."'49 The court noted that grave constitutional problems would
arise if constitutional issues were entrusted to the NLRB which lacks experi50
ence and necessary ancillary powers to conduct such cases effectively.
II.

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Timeiwness of Appeal

A.

The Tenth Circuit addressed in several cases this past year the issue of
timeliness of appeal. As in the past, the court interpreted its jurisdiction
51
narrowly.
Three of the cases involved construction of revised rule 4 of the Federal
Rules of Appellate Procedure. The most significant of the three is Mayfld v.
United States Parole Commission.52 Mayfield, apro se appellant, filed his notice
allowed
of appeal three days after the expiration of the sixty-day period
53
under Rule 4(a)(l) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Several cases have held that compliance with the time limitations of
rule 4 are '"mandatory and jurisdictional." 5 4 However, a majority of the
circuits, including the Tenth Circuit, had ruled that if a notice of appeal was
not filed within the time prescribed by rule 4(a), but was submitted within
the rule's thirty-day grace period, 5 5 the case would be remanded for a determination of whether appellant's tardiness was the result of excusable neglect. 56 If the district court decided that appellant's late notice of appeal
48. 637 F.2d at 747.
49. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480-81 (1955).
50. 637 F.2d at 747.
51. See Federal Practice and Procedure, Seventh Annual Tenth Circuit Suvey, 58 DEN. L.J. 371

(1980).

52. 647 F.2d 1053 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam).
53. The normal appeal period in a civil case is 30 days, but when the United States or any

of its agencies or officers is a party, any party may take an appeal within 60 days of the entry of
judgment. FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1).
54. E.g., Browder v. Dept. of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257 (1978); United States v. Robinson,
361 U.S. 220 (1960) (decided under old rules 37 & 45); Silvia v. Laurie, 594 F.2d 892 (1st Cir.
1979); Moorer v. Griffin, 575 F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1978).
The use of the wordjurcidictional in conjunction with rules of procedure may be deceptive.

Strictly speaking, the rules are not jurisdictional as that term is used in denoting subject matter
jurisdiction. The Supreme Court has recognized this distinction and in recent years has included quotation marks around the phrase 'mandatory and jurisdictional'. Browder v. Dep't of
Corrections, 434 U.S. at 264. A lengthy analysis of the conceptual problems caused by misuse of
the term is beyond the scope of this article. For a good, brief discussion of the jurisdictional
nature of rule 4, see 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 204.02[2] (2d ed. 1980).
55. Before the 1979 amendments, rule 4(a) provided that "[ulpon a showing of excusable
neglect, the district court may extend the time for filing the notice of appeal by any party for a
period not to exceed 30 days from the expiration of the time otherwise prescribed by this subdivision." The 30-day grace period is important because its limits have become jurisdictional cutoffs for appeals.

56. See, e.g., United States v. Lucas, 597 F.2d 243 (10th Cir. 1979); Moorer v. Griffin, 575
F.2d 87 (6th Cir. 1978); United States v. Shillingford, 586 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1978); United
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was the result of excusable neglect, the court of appeals would have author57
ity to proceed.
In 1979 the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure were amended. The
Tenth Circuit decided in Mayfteld how the 1979 amendments affected extensions for excusable neglect under rule 4. The issue before the court was
"whether we can remand for a hearing to determine whether excusable neS
glect warrants an extension of time to file the notice of appeal." 58
In United States v. Lucas ,59 decided under old rule 4, the Tenth Circuit
held that the "only generally accepted prerequisite establishing appellate jurisdiction is the filing of a notice ofappeal. . . within the maximum period for
which the district court can grant an extension of time based on a showing of
excusable neglect under Fed. R. App. P. 4."60 According to Lucas, since the
notice of appeal was the only jurisdictional prerequisite and the notice had
61
been filed, the motion for an extension of time was a mere technicality.
The untimely notice of appeal, which did not rise to the stature of an irreparable jurisdictional defect, could be overcome by a district court ruling nunc
6
pro tune that the late filing was the result of excusable neglect. 2
The court in Mayftld found that the ruling in Lucas, as it pertains to
civil appeals, became obsolete when revised rule 4 was promulgated. 63 The
court noted that the 1979 amendments had made the filing of a motion for
extension a jurisdictional prerequisite. 64 Although the old rule required only
that the motion be made with such notice as the court deemed appropriate, 6 5 the current rule restricts the district court's power to "extend the time
States v. Umfress, 562 F.2d 359 (5th Cir. 1977). The language in several of these cases indicates
that pro se appellants might be treated more leniently than appellants who are respresented by
counsel when they do not meet the rule 4 requirements, but the holding in Mayfrid will likely
make this distinction moot.
One Third Circuit case held that the appellate court had no authority to remand when it
had no jurisdiction; it could only announce it was without jurisdiction and dismiss the appeal.
United States v. McKnight, 593 F.2d 230 (3d Cir. 1979). In a dissenting opinion, however,
Judge Adams concluded that a remand was appropriate since it was for the "limited purpose of
ascertaining facts upon which the question of jurisdiction turns [and] is not a novel exercise of
authority by a federal appellate tribunal." Id. at 234 (Adams, J., dissenting).
57. 647 F.2d at 1059.
58. Id.
59. 597 F.2d 243 (10th Cir. 1979).
60. Id. at 245 (emphasis added).
61. The court in Lucas stated:
Itis the opportunity to establish excusable neglect which courts should extend to appellants such as Lucas who have tried, but technically failed, to comply with the requirements for filing a notice of appeal.
Accordingly, we hold that a defendant who filed his notice of appeal beyond the
time specified in Fed. R. App. P. 4, but within the thirty-day permissible extension
period, should have the opportunity to seek relief by showing excusable neglect. Id.
(citations omitted).
62. Id.
63. The court noted that the 1979 amendments did not change rule 4(b) which governs
criminal appeals. 647 F.2d at 1055 n.4. Thus, Lucas presumably still applies to criminal appeals
under rule 4(b).
64. 647 F.2d at 1055. The Advisory Committee Notes to rule 4(a)(5) explicitly state that
the amendment "make[s] it clear that a motion to extend the time must be filed no later than 30
days after the expiration of the original appeal time, and that if the motion is timely filed the
district court may act ....

65. Since no time limit was placed on this nonjurisdictional prerequisite courts often per-
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for filing a notice of appeal upon motion fled not later than 30 days after the expiration ofthe tuneprescribedby this Rule 1(a). "66 Because Mayfield had not filed a

motion for extension of time within the prescribed time or within the grace
period and the district court had never entered an order extending the time,
jurisdiction over the case never vested in the court of appeals. Since the time
for filing under rule 4(a)(5) had passed
without such a filing, the appellant
67
had extinguished his right to appeal.
The court further rejected the appellant's argument that the district
court's filing and acceptance of the notice of appeal should be construed as a
grant of an extension of time. 68 The court noted that although the Lucas
ruling on extensions of time was superceded by the revisions to rule 4, the
rest of the Lucas opinion remains in effect. In Lucas, the court had held that
while rule 4 demanded a judicial determination that excusable neglect existed, the acceptance of a notice of appeal for filing was a mere clerical function. 69 Thus, the court concluded that acceptance of the appellant's
argument would put rule 4(a)(5) practice in the same posture it had been
before rule 4 was rewritten, which is precisely the practice that the Advisory
Committee had said was to be avoided.70
The court expanded its interpretation of amended rule 4 in Oda v. Transcon Lines Corp.71 Appellant Oda had filed several motions after the prescribed appeal period had run, but within the thirty-day grace period. The
motions included a motion to extend time for filing notice of appeal, and a
notice of appeal. The appellant did not give notice of the motions to the
appellee at that time and he did not set the motions for hearing. Nevertheless, the district court granted the motion to extend time ex parte, after
72
which the appellant gave notice to the appellee.
In the circuit court, the appellee argued the appeal should be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction because the appellant had not given proper notice of
the motion to extend time under rule 4(a)(5). The court agreed, although it
ruled that Oda's right to appeal had not been "extinguished beyond revival"
73
as was the petitioner's in Mayfeld.
As previously discussed, rule 4(a) had been amended to make the motion for extension of time a formal, jurisdictional step to be taken before the
appellate court has authority to act, 74 and the current rule 4 forbids ex parte
action on motions filed after the prescribed appeal period. 75 The old rule
mitted "a showing of excusable neglect long after the fact when the appellant has neglected to
make his Rule 4(a)(5) motion on time." 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 1 204.13121 at 4-103
(2d ed. 1980).
66. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) (emphasis added).
67. 647 F.2d at 1055.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) (Advisory Comm. Notes). See note 64 supra.
71. 650 F.2d 231 (10th Cir. 1981).
72. Id. at 232.
73. Id.
74. See notes 50-70 supra, and accompanying text.
75. The current rule states: "Any such motion [to extend] which is filed before expiration
of the prescribed time may be ex parte unless the court otherwise requires." FED. R. App. P.
4(a)(5). By implication, a motion filed after expiration of the prescribed time may not be ex
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had permitted motions for extension to be filed "with such notice as the
court shall deem appropriate, '76 and courts in several cases did not require a
written motion until it was found that the notice of appeal was filed late and
that the court of appeals would not proceed without a finding of excusable
neglect. 77 After the 1979 amendments, however, the motion to extend is a
formal requirement as noted in Mayf1ld, as is proper notice to other parties.
Rule 4(a)(5) states: "Notice of any such motion which is filed after expiration of the prescribed time shall be given to the other parties in accordance
with local rules." The Tenth Circuit ruled that notice of the motion was
required to be given to the appellee within the thirty-day grace period before
78
jurisdiction to act on the motion vested in the district court.
Since the district court was without jurisdiction to act ex parte on Oda's
motions, its order was void ab initio. 79 When Oda subsequently picked up

the copies and mailed them to appellee within the thirty-day grace period,
jurisdiction vested in the district court.8 0 Appellant had finally taken both
steps required by the rule. He had made the motion to extend8 1and had given
notice to the other party within the thirty-day grace period.
The court stated that "[t]he [district] court's

. . .

order, being a nullity,

did not divest the court of jurisdiction or in any other way alter the status
quo.")8 2 It still had jurisdiction to determine whether excusable neglect warranted an extension of time, a finding which was necessary before appellate
jurisdiction could attach. Therefore, the court of appeals dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction, subject to district court action which could later vest
83
jurisdiction in the court of appeals.
An unpublished opinion, Beehive International, Inc. v. Soroc Technology,
Inc., 8 4 further indicated the court's intention to interpret compliance with
the provisions of rule 4 as "mandatory and jurisdictional." On its own motion, the court dismissed a cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction because it was
untimely.8 5
parte. This interpretation accords with the "mandatory" nature of rule 4, and the Advisory
Committee's comment that "[a]fter the expiration of the initial time a motion for the extension
of the time must be made in compliance with the F.R.C.P. and local rules of the district court."
FED. R. App. P. 4(a)(5) (Advisory Comm. Notes).
76. FED. R. App. P. 4 (1976).
77. Numerouspro se appellants, when advised that the court of appeals could not act without a district court finding of excusable neglect, were permitted to petition the district court
even after their hearing in the circuit court. See 9 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACrICE 204.12121 (2d
ed. 1980) and cases cited therein.
78. 650 F.2d at 232. This is consistent with the Advisory Committee's intent and with rule
5 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See note 75 supra. Rule 5 states that "every written
motion other than one which may be heard ex parte. . . . shall be served upon each of the
parties." FED. R. Civ. P. 5(a). Since the late motion to extend could not be ex parte, it had to
be served on opposing parties before jurisdiction attached. The Tenth Circuit had previously
ruled that "timely filing and service are both prerequisite to an effective motion for new trial."
Sutherland v. Fitzgerald, 291 F.2d 846 (10th Cir. 1961).
79. 650 F.2d at 232.
80. Id. at 232.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 233.
84. Nos. 80-1661, 1743 (10th Cir. Nov. 18, 1980) (not for routine publication).
85. Id.
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Under rule 4(a)(3) a party may file a cross-appeal within a prescribed
time period or within fourteen days after another party has filed an appeal.
Although Beehive admittedly filed its notice of cross-appeal late, it argued
that the untimely cross-appeal was not an irreparable jurisdictional defect
when "the same issue is raised in the cross-appeal as was timely raised in the
initial appeal."'86 It further argued that compliance with rule 4 on crossappeals is a matter of practice rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite when
the same issue is raised by both.8 7
The circuit court found that the same issues were not raised in the crossappeal and the initial appeal. Beehive's request for relief was distinguishable
from Soroc's request. 88 While Soroc contended that the damages awarded
were excessive, Beehive argued that the damages were insufficient. The
court stated that "a non-appealing party can [not] expand the scope of an
appeal beyond the issues raised by an appellant." 8 9
Thus, the court did not address the question of whether rule 4(a)(3)
should be considered a rule of practice rather than a jurisdictional prerequisite when the issue raised by both parties is the same. It appears, however,
that barring exceptional circumstances the Tenth Circuit will probably require strict adherence to the provisions of rule 4.
The final case which dealt with timeliness of appeal was Se/co Supply Co.
v. EPA .o At issue was whether a petition for reconsideration of an EPA
order tolled the running of time for appeal. 9 1 The court held that since the
statute providing for judicial review 92 made no provision for petitions to reconsider, such motions could not toll or alter the time for appeal. 93 Selco's
appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because it was filed after the
sixty-day period permitted by statute. Alternatively, the court ruled that
even if tolling were permitted, Selco's appeal would be dismissed as premature because it was filed before final action on the petition for
reconsideration .94

Selco arose under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide
Act (FIFRA). 95 Judicial review of administrative orders under FIFRA is
governed by section 136n 9 6 Although section 136n does not mention motions to reconsider or motions to reopen, the EPA regulations that supplement section 136n do provide for petitions to reconsider and reopen if filed
within ten days of the order. 97 Judge Breitenstein reasoned that the EPA
regulations could not provide for tolling when there was no such provision in
86. No. 80-1743, slip op. at 3.
87. Se, e.g., Scott v. University of Del., 601 F.2d 76 (3d Cir.), cert. dented, 444 U.S. 931
(1979); In re Continental Mortgage Investors, 578 F.2d 872 (1st Cir. 1978); Grunin v. Int'l House
of Pancakes, 513 F.2d 114 (8th Cir.), cert. dentied, 423 U.S. 864 (1975).
88. No. 80-1743, slip op. at 4.
89. Id. at 3-4.
90. 632 F.2d 863 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. dented, 101 S. Ct. 1740 (1981).
91. Id. at 864.
92. 7 U.S.C. § 163n (1976).
93. 632 F.2d at 865.
94. Id.

95. 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1976).
96. Id. § 136n.
97. 40 C.F.R. § 168.70 (1977) (repealed and consolidated into 40 C.F.R. § 22 (1981)).
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the statute. 98 The court added that "[d]ecisions under other federal statutes
permitting tolling of the limitation period are not pertinent." 99

Judge Seymour wrote a compelling concurring opinion in which she
agreed that the appeal should be dismissed as premature, but concluded that
a motion for reconsideration should toll the time to appeal.10° She argued
that decisions in other cases permitting tolling were pertinent.' 0 ' Judge Seymour cited a number of cases for the proposition that "where a statute or a
regulation provides for agency reconsideration, courts have held that a mo-

tion for reconsideration delays the time for seeking judicial review until the
agency has acted upon the motion." 10 2 This line of authority plus strong
policy considerations favoring such delay convinced Judge Seymour that a
03
similar rule should be adopted in this EPA case.'
B.

Final Orders

Federal courts of appeals have jurisdiction only to the extent that Congress has granted it to them. Generally, exercise of their appellate jurisdiction over district court cases is limited to final decisions. 1° 4 Exceptions to
this rule have been created for certain interlocutory orders 10 5 as well as situations in which a district judge makes a non-final order but certifies it for
immediate appeal.' 0 6 The Tenth Circuit became concerned this past term
10 7
that these jurisdictional requirements for an appeal were misunderstood;
98. 632 F.2d at 865. The court cited Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969), and
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), for the proposition that "[tederal courts may exercise only
that judicial power provided by the Constitution and conferred by Congress." 632 F.2d at 865.
99. 632 F.2d at 865.
100. Id. at 866 (Seymour, J., concurring).
101. Id.; see Outland v. CAB, 284 F.2d 224 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
102. 632 F.2d at 866 (Seymour, J., concurring).
103. Id.
104. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976). "The courts of appeals shall have jurisdiction ofappeals from
all final decisions of the district courts . . . except where a direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court." Id.
The Supreme Court has recognized that "[tihe finality requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1291
embodies a strong congressional policy against piecemeal reviews, and against obstructing or
impeding an ongoing judicial proceeding by interlocutory appeals." United States v. Nixon,
418 U.S. 683, 690 (1974). In certain circumstances the Court has been called upon to determine
what Congress intendedftial to mean, and when injustices might result, the Court has determined thatfinal does not necessarily mean absolutelyfial. E.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S.
683 (1974); United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530 (1971); Perlman v. United States, 247 U.S. 7
(1918).
105. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1976). Two cases this past term involved section 1292(a).
Milonas v. Williams, 648 F.2d 688 (10th Cir. 1981) (failure to cite section 1292 in notice of
appeal is not jurisdictionally fatal); Lexco v. United States, No. 79-2217 (10th Cir. Oct. 30,
1980) (standard used on appeal of injunction order under section 1292(a)(1) is a clear showing
of abuse of discretion).
106. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976); FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Section 1292(b) permits a district
judge to certify an order for immediate appeal when he is "of the opinion that such order
involves a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of
opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation." 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Upon application the circuit court has
discretion to grant an appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Rule 54(b) allows a district judge to certify
for appeal as a final order any order which determines the status of fewer than all claims or
parties "only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an
express direction for the entry of judgment." FED. R. Civ. P. 54(b).
107. A.O. Smith Corp. v. Sims Consol. Ltd., 647 F.2d 118, 119 (10th Cir. 1981).
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a number of cases had been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the
appealed ruling was not a final order and no rule 54(b) certification had
been obtained.' 0 8 The court, in A. 0. Smith Corp. v. Sims ConsolidatedLtd, 09
explained its authority to act in this area.
The district court, on several motions for summary judgment, dismissed
Smith's complaint and determined all issues before it except a malicious
prosecution counterclaim."10 Smith filed a notice of appeal, and when he
was advised that the court of appeals was considering dismissing the appeal
for lack ofjurisdiction, Smith subsequently obtained from the district court a
The question before the cirrule 54(b) certification of its original order.'
cuit court was whether the rule 54(b) certification acted nuncpro lunc to cure
Smith's defective appeal.' 12
The court declined to follow a recent decision by the Seventh Circuit
which held that certification secured after filing a notice of appeal does act
nuncpro tune. 1"3 The Tenth Circuit analogized rule 4(a) of the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure to rule 54(b).' 14 A proper 54(b) certification makes
an order appealable as a matter of right under section 1291 of the Judiciary
and Judicial Procedure Act;'" the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure
would therefore apply. The court found that the intent behind rule 4, as
amended, was persuasive authority to establish a rule contrary to that in the
Seventh Circuit."1 6 The court noted that the reviser's notes to rule 4 indi108. Peterson v. Koch Indus., Inc., No. 81-1282 (10th Cir. June 3, 1981); Quistberg v.
Natomas Energy Co., No. 80-2192 (10th Cir. June 3, 1981); Smith v. Hill, No. 81-1075 (10th
Cir. June 3, 1981); Radiology Management Trust v. United States, No. 80-2281 (1Oth Cir. May
14, 1981); Brazell v. Bergland, No. 80-2185 (10th Cir. May 12, 1981); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Anderson, No. 80-1924 (10th Cir. March 30, 1981); Viersen & Cochrane Drilling Co. v. Grynberg, No.
80-2325 (10th Cir. Feb. 27, 1981); Farrar v. Northrop Worldwide Aircraft Serv., Inc., No. 801456 (10th Cir. Jan. 28, 1981); Price Dev. Co. v. Casper Properties, No. 80-1454 (10th Cir. Dec.
11, 1980); Short v. Graves, No. 80-1105 (10th Cir. Aug. 22, 1980); Harris v. Tri-State Ins. Co.,
No. 80-1007 (10th Cir. July 18, 1980).
In each of these cases the court cited as authority olden Villa Spa, Inc. o. Health Indus., Inc.,
549 F.2d 1363 (10th Cir. 1977), which states that "the jurisdiction of a court of appeals is limited by statute to review of 'final decisions' of the district courts." Id. at 1364 (citing 28 U.S.C.
1291 (1976)). Where there are multiple claims or multiple parties, no order is appealable which
determines the status of fewer than all of the claims or all the parties unless a rule 54(b) certification is obtained. 1d.
109. 647 F.2d 118 (10th Cir. 1981).
110. d. at 119. The defendant who raised the malicious prosecution issue filed a notice of
intent to proceed on the issue after summary judgment was denied. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Meat Cutters Local P-171 v. Thompson Farms Co., 642 F.2d 1065, 1073-75 (7th Cir.
1981). The appellant in Thompson obtained a § 1292(b) certification from the district court
judge after filing the notice of appeal, but it was treated as a 54(b) certification. 642 F.2d at
1068-73.
The Thompson court made an exception to the general rule that a notice of appeal divests a
district court of jurisdiction to proceed any further in the matter. Id. at 1073. In support, it
found that the general rule had "always been shot through with exceptions," and it found
guidance in several Supreme Court decisions in which purely formal deficiencies were overlooked when strict adherence to the rule might result in an injustice. Id. The leaps in logic and
willingness to make exceptions to the rule may have impaired its precedential value for the
Tenth Circuit.
114. 647 F.2d at 120.
115. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
116. 647 F.2d at 120.
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cate that a notice of appeal filed before district court action on motions enumerated in rule 4(a)(4) should be determined premature and incapable of
bestowing jurisdiction on the court of appeals because "it would be undesirable to proceed with the appeal while the district court has before it a motion the granting of which would vacate or alter the judgment appealed
from."' 17 By analogy, the same rule should apply when a notice of appeal is
filed before the district court enters an order on a 54(b) certification. This is
another instance where the district court has a motion before it which must
be decided before jurisdiction vests in the circuit court." 18
The court further stated that no prejudice results for an appellant in
this scheme, even though this particular appeal was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction. The appellant has an appeal period which runs from the entry
of the 54(b) certification, or he can appeal when the final judgment is
entered. 19
III.

PARTIES AND PLEADING

Failure to prove standing to sue precluded the court's determination of
alleged first amendment violations in Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church
and Slate o. City and County of Denver. 120 The plaintiffs (Citizens) claimed in
the district court that the City and County of Denver's Christmas display'21
created excessive government entanglement with religion and violated the
first amendment. 122 They set a hearing for preliminary injunction before
the defendant was required to respond and the hearing was consolidated
with the trial on the merits under rule 65(a)(2).' 23 The trial judge ruled that
117. Id. (quoting 1979 Notes of the Advisory Comm. on Appellate Rules, 28 U.S.C. (1980)).
118. Before the 1979 amendments, in an appellate rule 4 proceeding, courts often remanded
for a district court finding of excusable neglect to cure the defective appeal. See 9 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE
204.1212] (2d ed. 1980). A similar process would occur if circuit courts
were to remand cases for a 54(b) certification.
However, the court is making the district court certification under 54(b) a jurisdictional
prerequisite to thefding of a notice of appeal. The Tenth Circuit had ruled previously that
"[tihe finality requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1291 must have been satisfied as of the date a notice
of appeal is filed." Century Laminating, Ltd. v. Montgomery, 595 F.2d 563, 567 (10th Cir.),
cert. granted, 444 U.S. 897, cert. dismtssed, 444 U.S. 987 (1979) (decided under old rule 4). Sims
Consohdated has been cited for the proposition that all jurisdictionalprerequisites such as the rule
54(b) certifation must be satisfied as of the date the notice of appeal is filed. Rosa v. Cantrell,
No. 81-1275 (10th Cir. April 24, 1981). See also Gooch v. Skelly Oil Co., 493 F.2d 366 (10th
Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 997 (1974).
119. 647 F.2d at 120-21. This is similar to the situation in Oda. If the district court has not
yet ruled on the motion to extend or on the certification issue, it still has jurisdiction to make
such a ruling and appellant's dismissal in the circuit court does not affect his right to appeal
once the order is finally made.
120. 628 F.2d 1289 (10th Cir. 1980).
121. The trial judge described the display as:
a spectacle of light(s), stars, candles, Christmas cards, an elves' toy shop, Santa Claus,
reindeer, flood lights, various tinsel, a cross, and the challenged creche or Nativity
Scene; . . . the creche consists of life-size figurines of Mary, Joseph, the infant Jesus,
shepherds, wise men, and domesticated animals, depicting the birth of Christ as described in the writings of St. Matthew, St. John, and St. Luke.
Id. at 1292.
122. Id. at 1291.
123. FED. R. Ctv. P. 65(a)(2) states in pertinent part: "[b]efore or after the commencement
of the hearing of an application for a preliminary injunction, the court may order the trial of
the action on the merits to be advanced and consolidated with the hearing of the application."
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excessive entanglement was apparent and the creche was ordered removed
from the display.

124

On appeal the defendant argued that the district court was without jurisdiction to enter its order because standing had not been proven. Citizens
had alleged standing in its complaint, but no evidence was offered on the
issue at the hearing. At issue before the Tenth Circuit was whether the defendants had admitted the jurisdictional standing allegation in the complaint or if Citizens was required to present proof of standing at the hearing.
The court ruled that the defendant was not required to have entered a response before the hearing date, so it was not required to admit or deny the
allegations of the complaint.125 Therefore, since Citizens failed to prove the
required basis for standing, the case was dismissed on appeal for lack of
jurisdiction. 126
Citizens made adequate standing allegations in its complaint, stating
that it was an unincorporated association whose members were taxpaying
residents of the City and County of Denver and whose taxes had been used
in erecting and maintaining the display. The court acknowledged that this
was a sufficient pleading statement of standing.'2 7 The court noted that "a
party must clearly demonstrate by facts alleged that 'he himself is adversely
affected' or those he represents have been 'injured in fact.' ,128
Citizens asserted that since it alleged standing properly in its complaint,
and the defendants had not denied the allegation, the issue must be deemed
admitted as stated pursuant to rule 8(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.129 The court agreed that rule 8(d) considerations were controlling, but
held that the rule placed the burden of proving standing on Citizens, not on
the defendant;13 0 denial or admission by the defendant of Citizens' standing
depended on whether a responsive pleading was required.
Citizens further contended that by stipulating to a rule 65(a)(2)13 1consolidation, the defendant had waived its right to file a responsive pleading
and thus admitted any issue it did not contest in the hearing. Again, the
court rejected Citizens' argument, noting that this was not a usual or routine
litigative procedure under which the City could be deemed to have made
such admissions by any waiver of an answer. '3 2 The answer of the City was
not due when the hearing on the injunctive relief was held; thus, there was
124. Citizens Concerned for Separation of Church and State v. City and County of Denver,
481 F. Supp. 522, 532 (D. Colo. 1979).

125. 628 F.2d at 1298-99.
126. Id. at 1299.
127. Id. at 1298 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83 (1968); Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923)).
128. 628 F.2d at 1296 (citing Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972); Data Processing
Serv. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970)).
129. FED. R. Civ. P. 8(d). Rule 8(d) provides in pertinent part: "[a]verments in a pleading
to which a responsive pleading is required. . . are admitted when not denied in the responsive
pleading. Averments in a pleading to which no responsive pleading is required or permitted
shall be taken as denied or avoided."
130. 628 F.2d at 1298.
131. FED. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(2).
132. 628 F.2d at 1298.
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no failure on the part of City to plead.' 33 The result of the court's decision is
that at a hearing consolidated under rule 65(a)(2), which is held before any
responsive pleading is either required or submitted, a petitioner must prove
every element of the complaint unless, in the testimony adduced at the hearing, the defendant specifically admits or confesses the elements.
The Citizens case returned to the Tenth Circuit within three months. In
its original order, the circuit court had held that the "appeal is dismissed and
the cause is remanded to the District Court with instruction to vacate the
judgment . . .for want of jurisdiction."' 34 The district court, aware of the
public interest in the case, noted that the appellate mandate was that the
judgment be vacated, and it thus determined that after vacating the judgment
it still had jurisdiction to reform the record so that a new judgment could be
entered.' 3 5 The City then applied to the Tenth Circuit for a writ of prohibition in City and County of Denver v. Matsch, 136 to halt further proceedings by
the district judge. A divided court held that the writ should issue. 137 The
court reasoned that when the case was first before the court, Citizens had
failed to prove its standing allegations. In the cases relied upon by Citizens
and the district court, the parties had been permitted to return to the district
court and correct technical pleading defects. 138 However, there was no
pleadin deficiency in this case, but instead a failure to prove for which there
is no right to return and correct the error.1 39 Conceptually, Citizens had its
day in court, but failed to prove its case. To allow Citizens to return and
correct its record could possibly lead to innumerable re-starts in cases where
a party has failed to carry its burden of proof.
IV.

SPECIAL MASTERS

In Polin v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. ,t40 a rehearing en banc was granted
after a panel of judges on its own motion had exercised its supervisory powId.
134. Id. at 1301.
135. City and County of Denver v. Matsch, 635 F.2d 804, 806 (10th Cir. 1980).
136. 635 F.2d 804 (10th Cir. 1980). The City actually requested a writ of mandamus to
compel compliance with the previous circuit court order. The Tenth Circuit found no harm in
the mislabeling of the petition. Id. at 809 n. 1.
137. Id. at 809.
138. Id. at 808.
139. Id. In his dissenting opinion, Judge Doyle claimed "[iit is fundamental that where
there is a lack of jurisdiction it does not have any effect on the cause of action. No adjudication
affecting the cause has been rendered. It follows, of course, that the complaint is open to
amendment and such should have been carried out." Id. at 809 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
The court may have been swayed by the fact that plaintff moved for consolidation. Advisory Committee notes to rule 65 indicate that a consideration of major importance is that a
plaintiff be given a full opportunity to prove its case. FED. R. Civ. P. 65 (Advisory Comm.
Notes). Here, the plaintiff was given that opportunity; any prejudice was caused by its own act.
140. 634 F.2d 1319 (10th Cir. 1980). The original appellate ruling on this issue was discussed briefly in FederalPractice and Procedure,Seventh Annual Tenth CircuitSurvey, 58 DEN. L.J. 371,
377 (1981).
This was the second time this case had been before the court of appeals. In the first case,
the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendant because the statute of limitations
had run. The court of appeals reversed. Polin v. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc., 511 F.2d 875 (10th
Cir. 1975).
133.
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ers to reverse and remand the case. 14 ' The panel determined that a reference to a special master by the district court violated rule 53(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 2 and amounted to an abdication of the

43
judicial function. 1

On rehearing, a divided court 144 ruled that it would not exercise supervisory powers to invalidate a 53(b) reference, but it would remand the case
because the district court failed to review the master's report as required by
rule 53(e)(4). 145 The majority decision by Judge Seymour summarily ruled
46
that the panel's use of the supervisory power was inappropriate. 1
The majority found a more serious problem which required a remand of
the case. The trial court had entered judgment as recommended by the
master, and did not indicate that it had reviewed the master's report and
recommendation.1 47 Apparently, the majority felt that it could not address
the appealed issue of the propriety of summary judgment until the trial
court had actually reviewed the master's recommendation. "Failure of the
district court to review and consider questions of law arising upon the special
master's report violates Rule 53(e)(4). District court scrutiny of the master's
report is essential ... .
On the rule 53(b) issue, the Poin majority's statement that "a reference
does not raise an issue of jurisdiction"' 49 is important because it is the issue
attacked by the dissent. Judge Doyle strenuously argued that an improper
order of reference does raise a jurisdictional issue and the court is authorized
to raise the issue sua sponte and remand. 150 Citing La Buy v. Howes Leather
Co. ,15' he reasoned that rule 53 was written "in aid of Article III of the
Constitution,"' 152 which is a jurisdictional matter. Further, Judge Doyle
141. 634 F.2d at 1320.

142. Rule 53(b) provides:
A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. In actions to be tried
by a jury, a reference shall be made only when the issues are complicated; in actions to
be tried without a jury, save in matters of account, and of difficult computation of
damages a reference shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional condition requires it.
FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
143. 634 F.2d at 1320.
144. Judge Doyle dissented and was joined by Judge Holloway and Judge McWilliams.
145. 634 F.2d at 1321. Rule 53(e)(4) provides:
The effect of a master's report is the same whether or not the parties have consented to
the reference; but, when the parties stipulate that a master's findings of fact shall be
final, only questions of law arising upon the report shall thereafter be considered.
FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(4).
146. 634 F.2d at 1321.
147. Id. at 1320.
148. Id. at 1321. Two subsequent cases were remanded by the Tenth Circuit in light of its
Polin decision. Warne v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., No. 78-1601 (10th Cir. March 2, 1981); Catts
Co. v. Gulf Ins. Co., No. 78-1452 (10th Cir. Dec. 15, 1980). In both, Pohn was cited for the rule
that the district court must consider questions of law arising upon the special master's report, as
required by FED. R. Civ. P. 53(e)(4). It is interesting to note that each of these cases involving
special masters originated in the same district court.
149. 634 F.2d at 1321 (citing Cruz v. Hauck, 515 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 917 (1976); Diamond Door Co. v. Lane-Stanton Lumber Co., 505 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir.
1974)).
150. 634 F.2d at 1324 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
151. 352 U.S. 249 (1957).
152. 634 F.2d at 1324 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
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found a commitment to strict enforcement of rule 53(b)1 53 evidenced in
prior Tenth Circuit decisions in Wilver v. Fiher154 and Bartlett-Collins Co. v.
Surinam Navigation Co. 155
Judge Doyle's opinion argued that although there were four dissents in
La Buy, the La Buy minority did not dissent on the issue of violation of rule
53(b).156 Judge Doyle's argument suggests that the minority in La Buy at

least tacitly approved the proposition that violation of rule 53(b) is a jurisdictional or article III matter which the court may consider on its own motion, waiting only until a final order is entered.1 5 7 The minority in La Buy,
however, contended that rule 53(b) does not involve jurisdiction or article
III;158 the majority never directly addressed the issue.' 59
The majority in Pohn directed its attention to this distinction and found
that "such a reference does not raise an issue of jurisdiction."'60 Therefore,
the court of appeals could not sua sponte attack the order of reference. Because the parties stipulated to the interlocutory order,' 6 t they raised no
timely objection to the discretionary order and thus waived their right to
appeal.
Two cases were cited by the majority in support of its interpretation. In
the earliest case, DiamondDoor Co. v. Lane-Stanton Lumber Co. ,162 the court of
appeals had refused to hear the appeal of a reference to a master when it had
been raised as an issue for the first time on appeal. The court had ruled that
objections to the reference could be waived because rule 53(b) is not
jurisdictional.1

63

153. Id.
154. 387 F.2d 66 (10th Cir. 1967).
155. 381 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1967).
156. 634 F.2d at 1323 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
157. Id.
158. The minority opinion of Justice Brennan states:
The case before the Court of Appeals was 'not a case where a court has exceeded or
refused to exercise it jurisdiction rule . . . .' Rule 53(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure vested Judge La Buy with discretionary power to make a reference ....
Here also 'the most that could be claimed is that the district court . . . erred in ruling
on matters within their jurisdiction." 352 U.S. at 260-261 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(quoting Parr v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 520 (1956)).
159. The majority only mentioned jurisdiction once in its opinion, stating that appellate
courts had power "to issue writs of mandamus in aid of jurisdiction," which was apparently the
case in La Buy. 352 U.S. at 255 (emphasis added). That presupposes, however, that jurisdiction
was not an issue. In fact, the majority concluded "that supervisory control of the District Courts
by the Court of Appeals is necessary to proper judicial administration in the federal system."
352 U.S. at 259-60. "Proper judicial administration" is not the same issue as jurisdiction of the
court.
Judge Doyle may be arguing that the "All Writs Act confers an independent appellate
power in the Courts of Appeals to review interlocutory orders." 352 U.S. at 263 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting). However, the majority in Polin implicitly ruled that was not a consequence of the
La Buy ruling.
160. 634 F.2d at 1321.
161. The Polin majority noted that the parties in La Buy had objected to the reference, and
the parties in Poltn had not. Id. Since the issue was not one of jurisdiction, but of abuse of
discretion, the Tenth Circuit felt that it was not authorized to act on its own motion with
supervisory powers. Id.
162. 505 F.2d 1199 (9th Cir. 1974).
163. Id. at 1206. Se also discussion in 5A MOORE's FEDERAL PRAcIrCE 53.05[3] (2d ed.
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In the second of these cases, Cruz v. Hauck,' 64 the pertinent facts were
identical to the facts in Polin: neither party objected to the reference in the
trial court, but the issue was raised on appeal. The Cruz court addressed
initially the problem of raising the issue for the first time on appeal:
Since the judge's reference was within his power [under Rule
53(a)], a challenge to that order is unlike a challenge to a court's
subject matter jurisdiction. The latter attacks the essence of the
court's powers. An order without power is void; a challenge, therematter jurisdiction may be raised for the first time
fore, to subject
16 5
on appeal.
It then addressed the applicability of article III and waiver of objections to a
reference:
The ineluctable conclusion is that the 'exceptional condition' limitation results from the deficiencies of the master system rather than
from constitutional limitations upon non-Article III judges.
We are of the opinion, therefore, that the policy underlying
Rule 53 is the alleviation of unnecessary burdens to litigants and
the cornerstone of the rule is the avoidance of delay, costs, and a
fact finder other than a judge. We see no reason why the parties to
are imposed, may not
the lawsuit, for whose benefit the restrictions
166
waive their objections to a reference.
This authority is the cornerstone of the majority's ruling on the issue disputed by the dissent. As the dissent pointed out, the result is that the excessive grant of authority may be corrected only by remanding the case to the
district court to review the referee's recommendations. 16 7 The problem of
the excessive order of reference remains; the only solution is that the judge
on review will negate the effects of the grant.
Franklin Delanor Patterson

1980); 13 C. WRIGHT, A MILLER, & E.
§ 2606 (1971).
164. 515 F.2d 322 (5th Cir. 1975).
165. Id. at 327.
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166. Id. at 330.
167. 634 F.2d at 1324 (Doyle, J., dissenting).

